



New Ways for Companies to Develop Effective Lobbying Strategies in the European Parliament

A case study in the field of the Common Agricultural Policy

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1 Introduction, objectives of the paper

Doing business in Europe more and more requires companies to influence decision-making and the legislative procedures – to put it simply, to lobby – in Brussels. The European Parliament plays a key role in the EU-level decision-making and legislative process, which was widened and reinforced in the Treaty of Lisbon. This is particularly the case regarding the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which constitutes the highest share in the budget of the EU.

This paper introduces a new method on how efficient lobbying can be done in the European Parliament and what role the MEPs – and their characteristics – might play in launching successful lobbying campaign. The research is based on the analysis of the legislative amendments proposed by the European Parliament to CAP-related legislative instruments. This paper is relevant for companies in the European agricultural and food industry sector, as well as for consultancies and lobbying companies in Europe.

Previous literature doesn't pay attention to those characteristics of EP amendments that might be derived from knowing that Member of the European Parliament (MEP) who proposed the amendment in question. This article comes up with MEP-related variables,

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which is a novelty in the array of similar previous articles. The testing of these variables allows us to map out statistically significant relationships between the explanatory variables and the amendment success. In sum, the analysis could also give an answer to the question what general characteristics a „successful” MEP has.

One of the aims of this paper is to define the characteristics of MEPs proposing successful amendments to CAP-related legislative instruments regarding the 2007-2013 programming period of the EU. The research aims at finding an answer to the question that what MEP-related characteristics and to what extent are the most relevant in influencing amendment success.

The primary objective of this paper is to determine the general characteristics of successful MEPs in the field of CAP. This might be conducive in selecting the key MEPs to lobby. This paper gives some hints for EU-level interest groups to identify key MEPs in the EP (i.e.: MEPs having the characteristics closest to the „ideal MEP”) and to concentrate lobbying activities on them („key MEP lobbying approach”). It might be a key step for interest groups towards increasing their influence in the European Parliament. The main research question is who to lobby?

2 Overview of the decision-making process: the Consultation procedure

EU decisions on the Common Agricultural Policy have been taken under the consultation procedure since its introduction in 1962. This decision-making procedure has been unchanged until 2009, so for the period this article examines, no change has been implemented in it. The lessons of the past, the lessons of more than forty years have not been built into the procedure.

Under this procedure, first, the Commission proposes a policy. Only the Commission can initiate the procedure, but it is required to make a proposal if the Council or the Parliament requests one. Thus the Commission has monopoly proposal power, but it does not have gatekeeping power. After the Commission makes a proposal, in the Council any Member States can propose an amendment to the Commission's proposal. In reality, there are no limits on the number of amendments in the Council, and all countries can propose amendments. If any Member States propose an amendment, the Council votes whether or not to accept the amendment. The amendment is adopted if all countries accept it. If no amendment is made or the amendment is not adopted, the Council subsequently votes on the original Commission proposal. The proposal is adopted if a qualified majority in the Council supports it. If the proposal is not adopted, no policy is implemented and the status quo prevails (based on Crombez, 1996).

Consultation procedure




Figure 1

Source: European Commission

The lessons learnt from the consultation procedure to date are controversial. Nevertheless, most of the scholars have the position that the European Parliament has only a limited legislative influence under this procedure.

Crombez (1996) concludes that the Parliament is powerless under the consultation procedure as its opinion to the Commission proposal is not binding. However, there is one tool in the hands of the EP: it can delay legislation by not issuing an opinion, and block other legislation if its opinion is ignored.

Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) also claim that "prior to the passage of the SEA and the creation of the cooperation procedure, the Parliament had scant legislative influence, even after its direct election in 1979when the consultation procedure applies, the Parliament's influence is limited to the threat of delaying legislation".

These positions are in line with Lucic's point of view (Lucic, 2004) who considers the role of the European Parliament as advisory, modest and limited under the consultation procedure.

In their comparative analysis between the consultation and co-decision procedures, Selck and Steunenberg (2004) claim that the European Parliament "is closer to the [final policy] outcome under consultation than under co-decision."

The role of the European Commission – its Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development – is twofold under the consultation procedure: as mentioned above, it firstly proposes the legislative instruments after an EU-wide public debate. Its second role is at least as crucial for the European Parliament: the Commission gives an opinion – for adoption or refusal – on the legislative amendments proposed by the MEPs. The

Council finally decides on the amendments with regards to the position of the European Commission on each of them.

Before the draft legislative instrument is tabled by the European Commission, MEPs have no formal access to the document, therefore no formal channels are available for MEPs to influence the starting position of the Commission. The possibility for MEPs to influence the draft version of the legislative proposals is very limited: MEPs, like all European citizen can take part in the preliminary public debate on the future of the Common Agricultural Policy. Civil organisations, companies, lobbyists and also the European Parliament play an active role in this public debate before the launch of the draft proposals.

When analysing the role of various actors in the formulation of CAP, it is important to make a distinction between budgetary aspects and policy consideration of the CAP. The EU budget is exclusively fixed by the Member States, namely the European Council (heads of state of governments). EU Budget is negotiated and under the seven-year Multi-annual Financial Frameworks (MFF) of the EU; in case of this research it is the MFF 2007-2013. Neither the total amount of EU budget, nor the allocation of the EU budget does not fall under the scope of authority of the European Parliament. Therefore the EP has no formal say in setting up the budget, it only has influence on the policy framework: to determine the way the budget is spent.

As for the decision-making procedure within the European Parliament, before the the rapporteur presents the draft report in the European Parliament on the legislative proposal of the European Commission, the rapporteur collects information from the political groups of the EP, from the members and substitute members of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development. The rapporteur also meets the representatives of the Member States, primarily the agricultural attachés in the Permanent Representatives of MSs in Brussels. Based on these interactions, the rapporteur tables the draft report, which already contains a number of legislative amendments reflecting the positions of the key stakeholders the rapporteur negotiated with. After the draft proposal is tabled by the rapporteur, MEPs officially present amendments to it. Each amendment is voted in the Committee of Agriculture and Rural Development in the European Parliament. Amendments supported by COMAGRI then tabled to EP plenary for a second round of voting.

One of the lessons regarding the common decision of nations through the European Parliament is that deeper cooperation among MEPs is formulated primarily along national lines: coalition-formulation of MEPs is more likely along the net beneficiary vs. net contributor division of Member States, as well as along the date of EU-accession, i.e. MEPs from new Member States are more likely to share the same position.

As for the different layers of influence of MEPs, I identify four of them:

1. During the public debate of the CAP: organising public hearings and conferences in the European Parliament;
2. Informal influence before the draft report is tabled;
3. Influence before the COMAGRI voting;
4. Influence before the EP plenary voting;

3 Theoretical overview and background

The role and influence of the European Parliament (EP) in EU-level decision-making have long been a centerpiece of discussion in political science. Treaties in last decades gradually empowered the EP and provided it with a bigger say in EU policy formulation. The evolution of the role of the European Parliament in the EU decision-making during the 1980s and 1990s is described in Shackleton (1999). The key milestones in this process were the Single European Act (1987), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999).

Since the late 1980s, a significant number of articles dealt with the EP's legislative power and influence. Research in this domain exclusively focused on the legislative influence of the European Parliament under different legislative procedures (Crombez (1997), Lucic (2004), Shackleton (1999)). Additional research in early 1990s focused dominantly on the comparison of the power of EP to other EU legislatures. Rasmussen (2003) analyses the role of the European Commission under the co-decision procedure. Interaction along the codecision procedure between the European Parliament and the European Council is emphasised in Shackleton (1999). Another approach is presented by Yordanova (Yordanova, 2009a) who is analysing the legislative power of the Committees of the European Parliament.

Evolution of decision-making in the European Union

Overview on EU Treaties and decision-making procedures

	Cooperation procedure	Consultation procedure	Assent procedure	Co-decision procedure
Treaty of Rome		Introduction		
Single European Act (1987)	Introduction		Introduction	
Treaty of Maastricht (1992)				Introduction: co-decision I.
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)				Modification: co-decision II.
Treaty of Lisbon (2009)	Repeal		Rename: Consent procedure	Rename: Ordinary Legislative procedure
		Special legislative procedures		Ordinary legislative procedure

Table 1

Source: Own composition

Spatial models are very popular to describe theoretical models of legislative powers of EU organs. The examples are the spatial models of legislative choice (Krehbiel, 1988), the spatial model of the co-decision procedure (Crombez, 1997). Crombez also tabled a game-theoretical model of increased involvement of the EP (Crombez, 2011) and another theoretical approach to EU decision-making, including the European Parliament's role (Crombez, 1996).

Most of the literature on measuring the EP's agenda-setting role and legislative power is analysing legislative instruments primarily from the 3rd (1989-1994) and 4th (1994-1999) EP period. Tsebelis (Tsebelis, 1994;) analyses amendments from 1988-89, while Kreppel covers longer periods: 1987-97 (Kreppel, 1999) and 1987-96 (Kreppel, 2002). Nevertheless, Burns (Burns et al, 2009) covers a period from 1999-2008.

Concerning agenda-setting, Tsebelis states (Tsebelis, 1994) that the EP has a significant role as a conditional agenda-setter in the EU political and legislative processes. Contrary, Moser states that EP has only limited power to influence political agenda (Moser, 1994).

The thematic scope of previous analyses cover various policy areas including environment-related policies (Burns et al., 2009; Tsebelis, 1994; Tsebelis et al, 1999;), health and safety policy (Lucic, 2004). In Kreppel's articles, (Kreppel, 1999; Kreppel, 2002) diverse policy areas – economic, environment, social affairs, transport, energy and legal affairs – are covered, analysing randomly selected legislative proposals in these policy domains. Nevertheless, to date, the legislative instruments of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – which amounts to almost half of the EU's budget – in 2007-2013 have not been analysed yet.

Although Kreppel (1999), Tsebelis et.al. (2001), and Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (1999) have performed some testing (with respect to cooperation vs. codecision), they chose as

their dependent variable the rate of successful amendments by the EP. However, these success rates are a procedural aspect of the decision-making process, which do not say much about the outcome of decision-making in terms of policy. Shackleton says that „numbers alone do not offer an adequate view of the impact of the Parliament”, regarding the percentages of amendments adopted as a sign of influence inadequate (Shackleton, 1999).

Shackleton broadens and fine-tunes his analysis by making differentiation between adopted EP amendments as follows: 1. amendments accepted without modification; 2. amendments accepted in compromise form; 3. amendments accepted in compromise form with a commitment for the future; 4. amendments accepted in compromise form along with a declaration (Shackleton, 1999). My analysis doesn't follow this detailed analysis, as only a very minor part of EP amendments have been accepted in a compromise form, therefore having limited added value.

Previous research in this domain exclusively focused on the legislative influence of the European Parliament under different legislative procedures. Most articles concentrate on the cooperation procedure (Tsebelis, 1994; Kreppel, 1999, LUČIĆ, 2004, Earnshaw et al., 1997), the comparison of the cooperation and co-decision procedure^{1, 2}(Kreppel, 2002) or solely on the codecision procedure (Crombez et al, 2011). The comparison of consultation and codecision procedure is done by Selck and Steunenberg (Selck et al., 2004). In a related context, consultation versus codecision procedure are analysed in Yordanova, 2009b.

There are divergent opinions of the power of EP under various decision-making procedures. Shackleton 1999 concludes that „even unanimity in Council does not prevent the Parliament from influencing outcomes substantially under codecision”. Tsebelis states that under cooperation procedure, the adoption of EP amendments happen frequently (Tsebelis, 1996).

Kreppel concludes (Kreppel, 2002) that „most of these studies refer to the data on EP amendment success rates published by the Commission and the EP. Unfortunately, these data are available only at the aggregate level, and little or no information about the significance of the individual amendments or what exactly constitutes “adoption” is available.”

Kreppel (1999) states that her analysis „clearly demonstrates, not only that the EP can and does have a politically significant impact on EU policy, but that this influence is not constant. The type and subject of the amendment, as well as the internal unity of the EP all significantly affect the probability of eventual adoption of an amendment by the Commission and Council. In addition, the research lends support to the common belief

1 Kreppel (2002) refers to the co-decision procedure created by the Maastricht Treaty and implemented in 1994, not the newly revised version of co-decision created by the Amsterdam Treaty and implemented in May 1999

2 Since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, codecision procedure is named “ordinary legislative procedure” under Article 294. of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

that the EP and Commission are frequently allies working against a recalcitrant Council.”

According to Jupille’s summary (Jupille, 2005), „if there is one point of consensus in the voluminous analytical and empirical literature on EU legislative procedures that has grown up over the last decade-plus, it is precisely that these rules really matter...”. „Different procedures entail variable legislative powers for the various actors. Enhanced parliamentary power is entailed by procedures, such as codecision, giving it amendment and veto rights in the legislative process.” (Jupille, 2005).

The Common Agricultural Policy of the EU is one of the most targeted policy domains by lobbyists. EP amendments play a crucial role in influencing the final shape of EU legislation. Identifying the powerful (successful) MEPs and their networks might give reasonable added value to interest groups when elaborating their lobbying strategies. Networking plays an important role in the literature of interest groups. Mahoney (2007) and Beyers et al. (2004) dealt with networks among interest groups and how forming or joining coalitions might improve the lobbying success.

The networks (persuasion network, access network) presented by Beyers et al. (2004) might be compared and even tested/challenged in the light of the networks I plan to present in this paper. Also, contrary to the approach of Mahoney (2007), who examined the networking and allying patterns of interest groups to form/join a coalition, my approach to networking lays in finding (potential) informal coalitions of political actors (MEPs, as „decision-influencers”).

Later, all this would give a room for additional research regarding whether interest groups following the „key MEP lobbying approach” and being aware of the dominant networks and alliances manage to exercise bigger influence than those applying more traditional means. (Chalmers (2011)). As a result, the three methods of measuring interest group influence presented by Dür (2008) might be extended or fine-tuned based on the prospective outcomes of my article.

Klüver (2011) explains EU level lobbying success by various characteristics of the policy issue (size of lobbying coalition around the issue; complexity of policy issue; degree of conflict over a policy issue). Unlike Klüver (2011), I focus on the characteristics of the person (MEP) having direct or indirect influence on the decision.

The existence of interest group influence in EU-level decision-making is evident for most of the stakeholders. However, measuring influence poses a huge challenge to scholars. Dür (2008) presents three methods of measuring interest group influence: process tracing, the ‘attributed influence’ method and assessing the degree of preference attainment. Klüver (2009) measures interest group influence by using quantitative text analysis.

There has been some previous research in analysing effective lobbying strategies in the European Parliament. Marshall (2010) devotes attention to whom to lobby in the European Parliament, but his research of interest group influence is limited exclusively to EP Committees, and only defining MEPs as friends or foes, with particular focus on

the rapporteur and the Committee members. Additionally, he examines the phases of decision-making at EP Committee level – draft, open amendment, compromise – aiming to identify the right phase to intervene and influence the decisions.

Marshall (2012) adds the role of EP Committee Secretariat officials to the analysis, aiming at finding out what informal role the Committee Secretariat plays in policy formulation and in indirect lobbying.

4 The research

4.1 Dataset, coding

A completely new dataset – comprising more than 400 EP amendments – has already been set up based on internal EP documents. As for the 2007-2013 EU programming period, the legislative instruments analysed are as follows:

Proposals from the European Commission:

- Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on the financing of the common agricultural policy³
- Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)⁴

Amendments from the European Parliament:

- Amendments to the “Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on the financing of the common agricultural policy”
 - AMENDMENTS 6-21⁵
- Amendments to the “Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)”
 - Amendments 30-342⁶

Amendments have been transformed into a binominal table, using 0 and 1 for coding.

Based on the above legislative proposals 335 parliamentary amendments have been analysed. Nevertheless, it is important to note, that because of proposals from multiple MEPs - i.e. amendments tabled by more than one MEP - several amendments had to be

3 COM(2004) 489 final, 2004/0164 (CNS), Brussels, 14.7.2004

4 COM(2004) 490 final, 2004/0161(CNS), Brussels, 14.7.2004

5 PE 355.726v01-00

6 PE 355.724v01-00

extracted in line with the number of MEPs proposing. It was inevitable in order to better identify and attach the characteristics of the MEP to the amendments concerned. Therefore, altogether, a database of 416 observations has been analysed.

4.2 Variables

In this research I analysed and tested two groups of variables. First, variables connected to the amendment and second, variables connected to the MEP proposing the amendment.

The first groups is as follows:

- Recital (amendment proposed to the „Recital” part of the legislative instrument);
- Policy-type amendment vs non-policy type amendment (Clarification amendment or extension amendment).

Having known the MEP, I added many additional explanatory variables to extend the scope of analysis. The second group of variables is as follows:

- Nationality of the MEP
 - Net contributor Member State
 - Member State with agricultural output/GDP ratio above EU average
- Party affiliation of the MEP
 - EPP – European People’s Party
 - EUL – European United Left
 - Greens – European Free Alliance
 - PES – Party of European Socialists
 - UEN – Union for Europe of Nations
- Individual amendment (only one MEP proposed)
- Constituency (MEP representing a constituency)
- Status of MEP regarding the membership in the Committee of Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) of the EP:
 - Member of COMAGRI
 - Substitute of COMAGRI
 - Other MEP
- Male

- Same government - the political (party) affiliation of the MEP is the same as the political affiliation of the government in his/her Member State

4.2.1 The dependent variable

Previous papers mostly measured the role and influence of EP by choosing the rate of successful EP amendments as dependent variable (Kreppel (1999), Tsebelis and Kalandrakis (1999)). In my article, I follow this measurement of „success” as well. Amendment success at this preliminary stage of research means the adoption of the amendment by the plenary of the European Parliament.

The following table gives an overview on the variables that previous articles analysed in the field of the European parliamentary amendments.

Factors increasing the adoption of amendments in the European Parliament

Summary of previous analyses

	Lucic (2004)	Tsebelis et al. (2001)	Kreppel (1999)
Less significant amendments	+		
First reading amendments	+		+
COM accepts EP amendment		+	
Clarification amendment			+
"Recital" amendment			+
Internal EP unity			+

Table 2

Source: Own composition

4.3 Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics in this context mostly measure the 'efficiency' of MEPs, where percentage values can be considered as 'success rates'. In sum, the EP plenary adopted 167 out of 416 amendments, which constitutes a 40,14% adoption rate.

4.3.1 Statistics related to the variables, which connect to the characteristics of the amendment

Adoption rates by the type of amendment

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Policy	257	101	39,30%
Non-policy	159	66	41,51%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 3

The above table shows that non-policy type of amendments has been adopted by the EP plenary at a higher rate.

Adoption rates by the part of the legislative instrument the amendment was proposed to

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Recital	53	20	37,74%
Non-recital	363	147	40,50%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 4

The above table shows that non-recital type of amendments has been adopted by the EP plenary at a higher rate.

Adoption rates by the number of MEPs proposing the amendment

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Individual MEP	270	100	37,04%
Multiple MEP	146	67	45,89%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 5

The above table shows that amendments proposed by more than one MEP have been adopted at a higher rate.

4.3.2 Statistics related to the personal characteristics of the MEP

Adoption rates by gender

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Male	208	75	36,06%
Female	208	92	44,23%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 6

The above table shows that amendments proposed by women have been adopted by the EP plenary at a higher rate.

Adoption rates by party affiliation in the EP

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
EPP	169	73	43,20%
EUL-NGL	5	3	60,00%
Greens/EFA	37	23	62,16%
PES	151	49	32,45%
UEN	26	4	15,38%
ALDE	28	15	53,57%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 7

The above table shows that amendments proposed by the EUL-NGL or the Greens/EFA Group have been adopted at the highest rates in the European Parliament. However, the small number of cases under these two Groups does not allow drawing ultimate conclusions on the relative power of EP-Groups.

Adoption rates by membership in COMAGRI

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Member of COMAGRI	165	75	45,45%
Non-member of COMAGRI	251	92	36,65%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 8

The above table shows that amendments proposed by COMAGRI members have been adopted by the EP plenary at a higher rate.

4.3.3 Statistics related to the Member State the MEP represents

Adoption rates by Member State

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
AT	1	1	100,00%
DE	64	42	65,63%
DK	2	0	0,00%
EN	41	9	21,95%
ES	83	24	28,92%
FI	6	4	66,67%
FR	83	35	42,17%
GR	36	19	52,78%
HU	8	4	50,00%
IE	3	1	33,33%
IT	46	7	15,22%
LU	7	4	57,14%
NL	31	14	45,16%
PT	5	3	60,00%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 9

The above table shows that - except the Member States whose MEPs proposed only a small number of amendments - German MEPs managed to reach a two-third adoption rate in the EP plenary.

Adoption rates by financial position of Member States in the EU

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Net contributor	281	116	41,28%
Net beneficiary	135	51	37,78%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 10

This table shows that the amendments proposed by MEPs from net contributor states have been adopted at a higher rate compared to amendments of MEPs from net beneficiary MSs.

Adoption rates by weight of the agricultural sector in the Member States

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Agricultural	295	107	36,27%
Non-agricultural	121	60	49,59%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 11

This table shows that amendments proposed by MEPs from non-agricultural MSs have been adopted at a higher rate.

Adoption rates by constituencies represented

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Constituency	170	51	30,00%
Non-constituency	246	116	47,15%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 12

This table shows that amendments proposed by MEPs representing a constituency have been adopted at a lower rate.

Adoption rates by MEP relationship with national government

Amendment	Total	Adopted by the EP plenary	Percentage
Same colour	179	60	33,52%
Different colour	237	107	45,15%
Total	416	167	40,14%

Table 13

The above table shows that 'same colour' amendments have been adopted by the EP plenary at a lower rate.

4.4 Statistical testing

4.4.1 Preliminary hypotheses of the testing

The main hypotheses of the research are that the following variables are significant:

- 'Recital amendment'
- Policy amendment
- 'net contributor' Member State;
- 'agricultural' Member State;
- EPP or PES Group of the EP;
- Individual amendment
- Constituency;
- Member of COMAGI;
- Same government.

4.4.2 Results of the analysis

At this stage of the research, I used multivariate statistical analysis to find statistically significant relationships between the explanatory variables and the amendment success as observed variable. Taking into account that all the variables are binary variables, I prepared the 2x2 contingency tables, pairing all the explanatory variables with the observed variable. Then I used the Fisher's Exact Test to calculate the significance of the relationship. This test has the advantage of being robust, with the disadvantage of excluding the affects influencing the outcome via other variables.

The computed p-values can be found in the following table:

Variables	0	1	p-value	
Recital amendment	40,5%	37,7%	0,765	
Policy amendment	41,5%	39,3%	0,681	
Net contributor Member State	37,8%	41,3%	0,523	
<i>Agriculture/GDP above EU average</i>	49,6%	36,3%	0,015	**
EPP	38,1%	43,2%	0,310	
EUL	39,9%	60,0%	0,395	
Greens/EFA	38,0%	62,2%	0,005	***
PES	44,5%	32,5%	0,017	**
UEN	41,8%	15,4%	0,007	***
<i>Individual MEP</i>	45,9%	37,0%	0,094	*
Constituency	47,2%	30,0%	0,001	***
<i>Member of COMAGRI</i>	36,7%	45,5%	0,082	*
Substitute of COMAGRI	35,6%	52,2%	0,002	***
Other MEP	48,2%	23,9%	0,000	***
Male	44,2%	36,1%	0,109	
<i>Same government</i>	45,1%	33,5%	0,020	**

Significant at 10% *
 Significant at 5% **
 Significant at 1% ***

Table 14

5 Conclusions

The main conclusions of the analysis are as follows:

- The above analysis shows that the variables related to the type of amendment are not significant. This is contrary to the preliminary hypotheses that ‘Recital’ and Clarification amendments might be significant.
- Contrary to the preliminary hypothesis, MEPs coming from ‘agricultural’ Member States are less likely to propose successful legislative amendments.
- As for the party affiliation, only half of the hypotheses is fulfilled: the PES variable is significant, although, surprisingly and contrary to the hypothesis, it diminishes the possibility of adoption.

- Smaller EP Groups like the Greens/EFA or UEN are significant variables, but we have to keep in mind the low number of cases examined.
- Contrary to the hypothesis, amendments proposed by a single MEP (Individual) are significant only at the level of 10%.
- The 'constituency' variable is significant, but contrary to the hypothesis, MEPs representing constituencies are less successful, their amendments are less likely to be adopted.
- Surprisingly, the 'Member of COMAGRI' variable is significant only at 10%. But, the 'Substitute Member of COMAGRI' variable is significant at 1%, and being a substitute member increases the possibility of adoption of amendments.
- The 'same government' variable is significant at 5%, but contrary to expectations, this variable diminishes the possibility of amendments to be adopted by the EP plenary.
- The 'male' variable is not significant.

Based on the above conclusions, I try to give a simplified answer to the main research question: 'who to lobby'? Amendments proposed to the non-recital part of the legislation shall be tabled by an MEP who is from a net contributor or from a non-agricultural Member State. The MEP shall be preferably a member of the Greens/EFA Group of the European Parliament and possibly a substitute member or member of COMAGRI. The best, if the MEP does not represent a constituency and is not from the same political affiliation as its government in its Member State.

Of course, this simplified answer shall be further elaborated and fine-tuned. Further research shall cover regression analysis, and also a model for structural equations – LISREL-model – might be developed in order to understand the inter-relatedness of influencing factors better.

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